Stability is Destabilizing

There are those who institutionally or ideologically burn candles at the altar of international stability. Stability, in their eyes, is the ultimate goal of international diplomacy. They see instability - of a ruler, country, or region - as a worse case outcome. On the other hand, there is a school of thought that embraces destabilization as a natural occurrence, something of a corrective, iterative process that will happen given intolerable conditions that incite citizens to rise up and overthrow a system or to demand outside intervention.
        
In Colonial America the situation had become unbearable for a significant number of citizens to destabilize the existing political paradigm and set out on a fresh track. By upsetting the traditional British system a new, better system emerged from chaos. In early 19th century Great Britain it was decided that the trade in human beings as slaves was intolerable and must be stopped. Despite international protest - including from the fledgling democracy America - to the contrary, the British Navy was dispatched to end it. Many in America, especially in the slave-dependent agricultural South, decried the action as economically destabilizing and harmful. Yet the ultimate result was a positive one.
        
In the late 1930s many were reluctant to interfere with Hitler's rise to power because such action would be unacceptable meddling in the internal affairs of another country. Mussolini's Italy was given a hand's off treatment for the same reason. Japan's Pacific aggression was treated as that country's private business. Ultimately all of those regimes had to be "destabilized" to the point of removal. Few today would argue against the wisdom of such a policy. Non-intervention in Rwanda was excused because it was not America's affair. Revolutions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia during Iron Curtain days were watched passively because America and the west did not want to provoke the Soviet Union.

The Middle East is a constant morass of failed social order. At the conclusion of the Gulf War proponents of allowing Saddam Hussein convinced the Coalition that removing the dictator would destabilize the region. An uncounted number of Shi'a Iraqis rose up against Saddam - encouraged by the same people who urged non-intervention - only to be massacred. Inaction in 1991 led to a bloodier war twelve years later.
        
As many cases could be cited in which destabilization led to an unfortunate, negative result. The point is not that one or the other is a preferable policy, but that each situation must be evaluated on its merits. At times destabilization is desired; at others stability may be preferable. What is wrong-headed is a fixation on one or the other as a universal solution. That is why proponents of stability at any cost are missing the mark.

Those who insist on a policy of stability - even if it means propping up the most loathsome regime or dictator - as preferable to the unknowns of replacement, stifle initiative and severely limit a wide range of other options.
        
As a group, journalists tend to fall prey to this type of mindset. During the run-up to the Iraq War, as an example, the New York Times editorial page was full of worry about "regional destabilization" that might result from overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The L.A. Times has frequent op-eds about potential catastrophes that could emerge if North Korea's Kim Jong Il falls.
        
Institutionally, the U.S. State Department, and, for that matter foreign ministries worldwide, are preoccupied with maintaining stability. Despite Senate confirmation testimony to the contrary, ("excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the hope of purchasing stability at the price of liberty." ) Secretary Rice has allowed her State Department to continue along the path of the "six decades" of failed policy that she initially decried.
        
If you ever have difficulty understanding the rationale for America propping up the despicable Kim Jong Il regime, or for that matter regimes in Iran, Venezuela, Syria, and Saddam's Iraq, you need look no further than the obsession for stability that consumes the State professional bureaucracy.
        
Nor is the fixation on stability sole province of any particular political party or ideology. Many Democrats fear U.S. interference in an area because it might destabilize the region. Republican "realists" such as former Secretaries of State James Baker and Henry Kissinger are strong proponents of stability versus freedom. Isolationists on the right such as columnist and Reagan advisor Pat Buchanan echo such concerns on a regular basis.
        
Ironically, one of the most destabilizing presidents in modern times, Jimmy Carter, is an outward fan of stability. His frivolous policy of casually undermining friends and allies of the U.S. - ostensibly to improve human rights - including Nicaragua, Iran, and South Korea, led to massive turmoil in those regions the consequences of which we fight against to this day. And, most tragically, human rights conditions declined precipitately in those places where his misguided policies were successful. One need only witness the internal brutality and sponsorship for international terror that the mullocracy of Iran has displayed to see the fallacy of the argument.
        
Worship at the false god of stability - regardless of apparent justification - is a course of action that limits options, freezes diplomatic initiatives, and condemns millions of people to a life without hope or freedom. The American Revolution was destabilizing. Taking arms against Hitler was destabilizing. There are times when destabilization of a rogue regime or harsh dictator while costly in the short term is a preferable policy to supporting a morally deficient position.
        
The lesson is not to promote stability or to undermine, but to assess each situation in totality with frank evaluation of possible outcomes. And to act accordingly. In foreign policy as in human relationships, there is never a "one size fits all" solution.

— Gordon Cucullu
October 1, 2008